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A classic work. Published by Cambridge University Press About this Item: Cambridge University Press, Condition: New. Ships with Tracking Number! Buy with confidence, excellent customer service!. Seller Inventory n. In Bearbeitung. Mills Hauptwerk der theoretischen Philosophie EA: London, in der kommentierten, historisch-kritischen Werkausgabe. Published by longmans green reader dyer london About this Item: longmans green reader dyer london , Brown Cloth. First Thus. Logic and moralities of the scientific philosophy are explored here.

The basis for the sceintific method and thus the difference between real and psuedo sciences. Bound in blindstamped brown cloth, with gilt titling on spine. Original owner, Signed and ex-libris stamped "Eugene Schuyler, Sept. Schuyler was of the first three Americans to earn a Ph. Minister to Greece. Rare association copy. Size: 8tvo. By Famous Owner. Ninth edition. In two volumes. With half-titles and a terminal advertisement leaf to Vol. Original publisher's green buckram, printed paper lettering-pieces. Slightest of rubbing, chipping to lettering-pieces. Remnants of book labels to FEPs, hinges reinforced with brown paper, else internally clean and crisp.

The first published work of Scottish philosopher John Stuart Mill , a detailed treatise on empirical and utilitarian systems of thought in which Mill presents his five famed principles of inductive reasoning. Size: 8vo. Seller Inventory AQ Published by Cambridge University Press. About this Item: Cambridge University Press. Seller Inventory NEW Published by BiblioLife About this Item: BiblioLife, Published by Longmans, Green About this Item: Longmans, Green, Condition: Collectible: Good.

Author's Sixth edition. Wear at edges and corners, else good. First of the sixth edition, revised by Mill. This copy was owned by Andrew Bisset. Both volumes are signed by him on the title page:"A. Bisset Nov. There is extensive critical commentary in ink in the margins of Mill's introductory essay to this sixth edition, entitled "Definition and Province of Logic".

Bisset was the biographer of James Mill, the British historian, economist, political theorist, and philosopher, who was the father of John Stuart Mill, the most influential philosopher of liberalism of his century. Ships from Dinkytown in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Signed by Other. Item added to your basket View basket.

System Logic by John Stuart

Proceed to Basket. View basket. Continue shopping. Title: system logic. United Kingdom. Search Within These Results:. Seller Image. A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. Two volumes. A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principal evidence, and the methods of scientific investigation MILL, John Stuart Published by John W. A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence, and the methods of scientific investigation.

Mill,John Stuart. Amsterdam, Netherlands Seller Rating:. Ratiocinative and inductive being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation [. A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. People's Edition. Galway, Ireland Seller Rating:. Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation.

Seventh edition. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer. A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation in two volumes Mill, John Stuart Published by London, Longmans Green, , 10th edition Fifth edition. A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive 2 vols.

But the relevant experience is not exclusively tactile, and need not be tactile at all, for visual space is a self-contained system that is generated by the complex structure of appearances as the eyes change conformation and viewpoint. Nor is it the case, as some Berkeleians supposed, that change of viewpoint is a tactual matter because it depends on the muscular sensations of perambulation: children have the full use of their eyes at an age when Edition: current; Page: [ li ] they lack effective use of their legs and are carried everywhere by their mothers.

And, again, the initial correlations between the spaces must be intuitive, because they could not be learned. Unfortunately he relies on the Cheselden case , which does not support him: it is that of a boy who has to catch his cat and hold her before he can tell she is not his dog. It is as though there were a second organ of vision gazing at the retina, which is envisaged as a tiny screen set up inside the head, like a camera obscura. Optical diagrams do not represent the processes of vision.

Bailey points out that only a material line a thin wire, or something of the sort could project anything in the fund of the eye, and then only if it stopped short of the eye itself; and if it did project anything in the fund of the eye it would have to be visible. These are phrases which describe no real facts. Yet Bailey wins only a debating victory. Bailey seems always about to discover the delusive nature of the optical diagram as a representation of the facts of vision, but never quite succeeds. The crucial consideration, that the clear and distinct retinal image is a fiction, is hidden from Bailey and Mill alike.

It is amusing to see how the two theorists deal with these facts. Bailey attributes the muscular sensations derived from the accommodation of the two eyes to the sense of sight; Mill, for whom only what can be read from the optical diagram can be visual, associates the same sensations with the sense of touch. Neither theorist shows any awareness that because of the indistinctness of peripheral vision, the shallow field of the lens of the eye, and so on, a viewer must be restlessly active in constructing a visual field that would have the characteristics they attributed to the retinal image.

Bailey comes a little way towards realizing this fact; Mill does not even begin. The issue between Mill and Bailey resists clarification, not merely because they are victims of a common delusion, but because each is involved in a hopeless confusion of terms.

Utilitarianism - John Stuart Mill

Mill speaks as if it were a sort of visible object, the ghost of a dimension; Bailey as if it were a homonymous term referring to disparate properties of visual and tactile spaces. One aspect of this terminological vagueness and confusion was clear to Mill. And on this subject Bailey complacently wallows in a slough of confusion. Everything else is attributed, on principle and without further ado, to the inferential and associative activities of the intellect, even though as Bailey justly remarks no inference can be detected, the grounds and conclusion of the alleged inference cannot be isolated, and no known or conceivable process of association could have the results claimed.

Never mind. What the retinal image cannot contain must be contributed by the intellect. On the main issue, Bailey has much the best of the argument. Mill admits that our notions of tactile space are much vaguer and less consistent than our notions of visual space. What is it that the understanding is engaged with? A neglected sign and an indistinct idea, between which the mind is thus bandied about, must assuredly produce a very obscure and unsteady discernment, while, in point of fact, nothing can be clearer or firmer than our perception of space in all directions, when we look round the room or out of the window.

Introduction

The confusion is hopeless. Bain supplied Mill with up-to-date scientific data for his Logic, and reviewed it in in the Westminster, to which he had begun to contribute in It seems a small world these intellectual radicals came to move in. Bain does not mention this distinction, and it is a puzzling one. Psychologists of both persuasions seem equally a posteriori in their methods: they seek to uphold their views by citing facts in approximately the same amounts—though not always the same facts. All and only what cannot be acquired must be assigned to instinct. Where the two schools differ is in what they say when confronted by a complex phenomenon of which neither can demonstrate the analysis.

They then dogmatize in different directions. The apriorists, instead of acknowledging a pragmatic limit to analysis, announce the discovery of an ultimate and forever irreducible intuition or instinct; the aposteriorists invent a spurious analysis in terms of whatever entities their method postulates. As an example of the divergent dogmatisms of the two schools we may consider the alleged infinity of time and space.

We know places where there are things, and places where there are no things; times when things happen, and times when nothing much happens. But in what sort of experience do moments of time and points of space, as such, form elements? What is supposed to be the difference between a time when time ends and a time after which there is infinite time in which nothing happens? Bain, though this hardly appears from the review, was not prepared to fudge his psychology as Mill did. His attempt to anchor his associationism to the physiology of the nervous system effectively prevented him from doing so.

Knowledge is produced by the accumulation of patterns of electrical discharges, each of which records something known and figures in memory simply by being repeated.

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The patterns can combine mechanically, but cannot fuse. Bain is thus committed, as Mill was not, to the programme of actually discerning and disentangling the elements whose association is postulated. In the end, this scrupulous atomism makes associationism implausible by multiplying the required number of brain traces beyond credibility; but at least we can guess what form an associationist explanation should take, which with Mill remains forever mysterious.

In fact, though a man of great learning and industry and a strong sense of fact, he had little gift for philosophical analysis. The pieces of his work are generally sober and well-informed, but are not always consistent among themselves; and this is nowhere more evident than in what he says of visual perception.


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Another vast area of confusion vanishes on the very first page. The old controversy had assumed that there was a problem about how we get from subject to object, from inner experience to outer world. But his version of the theory of vision, in which he virtually claims that Bain agrees with him despite some over-emphasis on the activity of the eye muscles, shows how far he is from appreciating the difference this makes.

For example, Mill still feels able to talk about the retinal image as a picture. From now on, one had a choice. Psychology could never be the same again. Yet we should be careful not to make too much of the differences between the two men. This point holds true Edition: current; Page: [ lxiv ] whether or not new-born animals have inborn tendencies to react to stimuli, of whatever kind. This implausible model seems to rely excessively on the singular helplessness of the neonate human.

It is his combination of unimaginativeness and implausibility together, of course, with the obsoleteness of all old science that explains why we no longer read him but still read Hobbes, who knew so much less but suggested so much more. Bain thinks of morality as wholly negative, a system of inhibitions built up in the first instance entirely by corporal punishment. The older philosopher is hampered by the empiricist traditions of atomism and reification, which turn the mind into a warehouse of ideas, and knowledge into an assemblage of separate facts about separate things.

If it is anything at all it is a real force; but it seems to be postulated only as a fiction, to reconcile the observed phenomena with the dogma of the conservation of energy. But working scientists are notoriously insensitive to considerations of this sort. But what is hidden from consciousness for Bain is not best described, as it is by Mill, as a hidden law obeyed by our volitions. For Bain, mental and neural phenomena run in parallel and do not interact. To every mental state answers a brain state. And the brain is an electrical machine, whose later states are accordingly a function of its earlier states and inputs.

Bain spends a surprising amount of space on various attempted reductions, but he shows little aptitude for these topics, and his later editions rely with relief on the authority of Sully. Ruskin, though some disparage his taste and reasoning power, has never been accused of deficiency in the amount of his aesthetic sensitivity. Perhaps Mill himself found deficient in such sensibility—by Bain! What Mill says about the necessarily negative nature of the evidence for apriorism sheds some light on a puzzling argument in Utilitarianism.

Mill there argues that questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof in the strict sense, but that the fact that each man desires his own happiness affords the sole possible proof that the happiness of all men is desirable. In the present passage, where Mill uses almost the same language, the nerve of the argument is exposed: that the failure to disprove a thesis for which there is prima facie empirical evidence, though not proving the thesis true, must be allowed to serve in lieu of demonstration in all cases where it is logically impossible that anything better could be found.

That would make good sense in the Utilitarianism passage. The things that ought to be desired must be among those things that can be desired, and the only logically possible way of showing that a thing can be desired is to show that it is in fact desired. It always remains logically possible that someone should discover an actual, and hence possible, and hence possibly proper, object of desire that is not reducible to a component of happiness; but no one has yet, despite all endeavours, managed to do so. Like Mill, Taine was something of an outsider in relation to the cultural establishment of his country.

But whereas Mill and associates could use the forces of Scottish irredentism and northern nonconformism, not to mention the private empire of India House, and set up University College in Gower Street to be a counterweight to the port-sodden churchmanship of the ancient universities, Taine was up against a more tightly knit and centrally controlled cultural empire. Nonetheless, the two men shared a feeling of being in an embattled minority. Thanking Taine for his series of articles on the Logic in the Edition: current; Page: [ lxix ] Revue des Deux Mondes, Mill says that when he began to publish he was almost alone in his views, and that even now the empiricist philosophers were outnumbered twenty to one; while Taine predicted that his own psychological work would find only a hundred readers in France and a hundred in the rest of Europe.

But his letter to Taine repudiates this ascription of national affiliations to schools of thought. The French think of empiricism as peculiarly English, the English as typically French. In reality, intuitionism and empiricism are related dialectically: the dominance of either calls forth the other as its antithesis.

Which of them happens to prevail in any particular milieu at any particular time is quite fortuitous; at the time of writing, Germany itself is swinging towards the empiricist pole. At first, Taine had not been deeply impressed: he found Jowett more progressive. It is therefore not surprising that Mill finds little in this part of the book to quarrel with. Taine himself thought otherwise: his original Preface acknowledges a debt to Condillac for one point only, and claims Mill, Bain, and Herbert Spencer as his chief creditors. He virtually accuses Spencer of plagiarizing his views for the revised edition of Principles of Psychology and falsely claiming that Taine got them from him.

He continues:. The operations, of which he constructs science, are those in which the English excel all others, and those which he excludes from science are precisely those in which the English are deficient more than any other nation. He has described the English mind whilst he thought to describe the human mind. The empirical concepts and generalizations reached by induction, even when based on Edition: current; Page: [ lxxii ] intelligible relationships and not merely on observed regularities, can never be extrapolated to remote situations with more than probability But the concepts that figure in the axioms of the exact sciences are not so much abstractions from experience as anticipations of experience, ideals to which experience can never be shown to conform The laws of the exact sciences are disguised analytic statements, depending for their truth on the analyses and reconstructions on which the concepts contained in them ultimately depend The laws of geometry and mechanics therefore have to do not with actual but with possible things.

In explicit contrast with Mill, Taine opposes the perceived likeness of two geometrical figures to the recognized identity of a geometrical construction. The repetition with which science deals is identical recurrence and not repeated likeness: we can thus be certain that identical causes will have identical effects, and in this sense the principle of induction is proved. But it is for experience to decide whether what we are confronted with is the same cause ; scientific laws are universally applicable, but it is for observation to decide when they are exemplified He agrees with Mill against the Germans in going from the particular to the general, instead of starting with a Weltanschauung and hoping that there will be somewhere for the chips to fall; but his work cannot be brought within the boundaries of associationism.

But what sort of necessity is he really invoking? Logical, or merely psychological? Mill would concede the latter but deny its relevance.

John Stuart Mill - Wikipedia

Scattered and occasional as they have been, our remarks seem to have tended after all towards one general conclusion. Mill prided himself on his open-mindedness, and Bain concurred. We saw him missing the main points in Bailey, misrepresenting Bain, using Grote as a peg to hang his own pet notions on, scrutinising Taine merely for possible agreements and disagreements, and professing, at the start of his review of Bain, an impartiality between schools of psychology that the associated correspondence belies.

Again, though early a champion of traditional formal logic against the psychologizers, he was so far from seeing the significance of the transformation of logic that began with Boole and was already under way in his middle years that Jevons could see his prestige as the main obstacle to logical reform. This judgment casts no discredit on Mill. Besides, open-mindedness is not soft-headedness.

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A man, unlike a government, is not called on to condone manifest errors, and all the incidental blindnesses and dogmatisms we have noted stem from his resolute opposition to a doctrine he believed to be fraught with immediate moral and political dangers. That this claim is so widely conceded is partly to be accounted for by the marvellous, almost hypnotic, breadth and equanimity of his expository style: his unexampled air of unruffled comprehensiveness and imperturbable reasonableness.

Only an independent reference to the books reviewed and the facts alleged can reveal the strong acids that were needed to blend such heterogeneous nutrients. Philosophy and the classics were life-long passions of John Stuart Mill. In his time philosophy had not been professionally categorized, and his writings tend to ignore the boundaries of logic, the philosophy of mind, and ethics, and to reflect his training in the classics.

But it is a mistake to ignore such essays as those here gathered, for they give a rich context to the major philosophical works and illuminate central aspects of his non-philosophical writings. In any case, cross-references among the volumes of the Collected Works is inevitable and desirable. The title of this volume might cause disappointment for some classicists: Mill commented very little on Roman history and literature; 3 for him the classics that spoke most clearly and strongly to the nineteenth century were Greek. Of the total, six the two on Bailey from the Westminster, and the four from the Edinburgh were republished by Mill in Dissertations and Discussions; the three from the Fortnightly were included by Helen Taylor in the fourth posthumous volume of Dissertations and Discussions.

No proof sheets have survived. Reserving mention of specific variants for the discussion of the individual Edition: current; Page: [ lxxix ] items, one may make a few comments about the changes in the six republished essays. In general, there are more, and more significant, changes in essays written before about which time Mill apparently first thought of a collection of them , and, as might be expected, there is a gradual reduction in re-writing as one moves from the earlier essays to those first published in the late s just before the first two volumes of Dissertations and Discussions appeared in the spring of When he revised those volumes for a second edition in , he introduced few further changes, and revised very lightly the essays published between and that were collected in the third volume of Dissertations and Discussions, which was first published in with the second edition of Volumes I and II.

As the six relevant items the last two of which appeared in that third volume have dates of , , , , , and , there are not many substantive variants, and few that reveal more than a desire for semantic or syntactic clarity or elegance. Accidental variants—basically changes in punctuation, spelling, and initial capitalization—are not here recorded. In general, the frequency of such changes parallels that of the substantives, there being more in the earlier essays, and very few deriving from the second edition of Dissertations and Discussions.

No other changes appear to permit valid summary, except perhaps the alteration of commas to semi-colons, which is surprisingly frequent in the essays reprinted only in ; there is a total of twenty-two instances in the three relevant items, with only one instance of the reverse change. These counts cannot be considered as exact, for some manuscript readings are uncertain and Mill often omits punctuation at the right margin. The individual essays are fully discussed in Francis E. The existence of the review is signalled in his later works only by the interesting quotation from it found in his System of Logic Collected Works, VII, , where he indicates that some of the views therein contained are no longer held by him.

A collation of the quotation reveals the trivial variants recorded on References are corrected in this edition, as indicated below. See the Introduction, xviii-xix above. The first group of four, those published in the Monthly Repository in and , does not survive in manuscript and was not republished by Mill. They cannot in any case be used until I return [from Paris] for it is necessary they should be carefully looked over, some passages altered, and some preliminary matter written.

The second group of five dialogues survives only in manuscript. Each was sewn together near the top left corner with green ribbon now removed. The folios are about See the illustration facing He did not number the folios, of which there are sixteen in the Charmides 16v blank , thirteen in the Euthyphron, seventeen in the Laches, thirteen in the Lysis, and twenty-six in the Parmenides 26v blank.

The translations are not complete, except for the Apology as Mill notes, , there being considerable summary sometimes signalled by indirect discourse and many omissions. In general, passages descriptive of action are omitted, while the dialectic is followed closely. Protagoras: a to a omitted; to b Gorgias: a to d Charmides: a to b Euthyphron: 1 a to 1 b Laches: a to e Lysis: a to d Parmenides: a to d omitted; to a The bulk of it, indeed, is quotation.

After virtually severing his connection with the Westminster in , Mill decided to contribute mainly to the Edinburgh Review. I will send the article to Mr Austin for it will have a chance of interesting him, though few people else. I should hardly have thought it worthy of the Ed. But Bailey is, I know, of that temper—or rather I infer it from sundry indications. Using a rough classification which is followed also in the discussion of variants in the other essays, and in the other volumes of this edition , these may be seen as falling into four types, reflecting 1 a change of opinion or correction of fact including relatively large expansions, deletions, or revisions ; 2 the difference in time or provenance between the separate publications; 3 qualifications and minor semantic shifts; and 4 minor verbal, tonal, and syntactic changes.

Here all but five may be placed, in almost equal numbers, in the final two categories. You will see by the article [in the Spectator ] that I like it very much. I was excessively sorry when I got to the end of it, and am impatient for the next volume. Of the twenty-three substantive variants in this essay, only two derive from the revision for the second edition of Dissertations and Discussions.

Of the twenty-three, four type [1] reflect a change of opinion or correction of fact, and three type [2] reflect the difference in time or provenance between the versions. Minor softenings of criticism may also be seen at l-l and m. He actually includes in it discussion of material from Volumes III-VIII, especially in sections incorporated in from the reviews of those volumes that he had written for the Spectator in the years between his two Edinburgh notices.

Harriet Taylor Mill obviously took an interest in this review, and, as she frequently did in these years, suggested changes. I am glad that you are so well pleased with the article on Grote. I would however have given the quintessence of the chapter on Dion if it had been possible to do it in any moderate space. You will see what I have done in consequence of your various suggestions. As you say, the tendency of [the] Athenian alliance must have been to favor democracy, but Grote has pointed out several instances in which one is surprised to find important members of the alliance under the government of oligarchies.

I have made a little alteration in the paragraph about Greek slavery, but it might look too much like an apology for slavery. Grote alluded to it saying M rs Grote had written to me after reading the article—I merely answered that I had found a note from her on arriving. There are some forty-five variants in this essay, five of them dating from the revision for the second edition of Dissertations and Discussions.

These substantially alter the effect of the review, 27 which, as mentioned above, did not deal only with the later volumes of Grote, and after was even less confined to them. He had, in fact, earlier made a more material effort, in conjunction with Grote, to make the work known.

The connections among Bain, Grote, and Mill of course went back further, and were to continue. Grote did the same. Textually the review is uncomplicated. Though beset by proof corrections of his own works, he had read Volume I of the Plato by 11 March, , and continued to read the other volumes as they came off the press. Henry Reeve, the editor of the Edinburgh, agreed to wait until the April number, and Mill continued his study, rereading Grote, and also the crucial Platonic dialogues.

Given the date of his essay, only one year before the publication of Volume III of Dissertations and Discussions, the number of variants twenty is even larger than the length of the review can quite explain. They are, however, almost all of type 4 , minor adjustments of syntax and tone such as those seen at i-i and j-j. Indeed, given his other preoccupations at the time, and the speed with which the review was written, it may be that these minor changes should be seen as merely the kind that he normally made in manuscript.

One must not conclude that he thought them unimportant, for the last section of the Autobiography was written in the winter of , before their publication. Sparshott points out, lxix-lxxi above. Textually the article is interesting in that a manuscript fragment has survived. Though it apparently is part of a rough draft, there are no substantive variants in sixteen places the Edition: current; Page: [ xcii ] manuscript has initial capitals, usually on abstract nouns, that were reduced in the Fortnightly.

As he then knew that it would be in the Fortnightly for January as it was , and since the press-copy manuscript has a notation that the proofs should be sent to John Morley, the editor of the Fortnightly who retained the manuscript see below , it would be reasonable to assume that Mill did not read proof, were it not that some of the changes between the press-copy and the printed version can hardly be editorial.

This article is unique textually, in that two manuscripts, a draft and the press-copy, have survived. The manuscript is written recto on unwatermarked light blue sheets c. The last two folios are a fair copy, in another hand, 46 of the concluding matter, which is not present in draft form. The unwatermarked purple-blue paper c. Were there manuscripts of all his essays, a different policy would be appropriate, as some readers will find the notes disturbingly frequent; we trust that those who do not wish to consult the revisions will find it possible to ignore the indicators.

In all, there are over substantive changes, all but thirty-four of them arising from the rewriting of the draft for the press-copy which is virtually a fair copy, with very few cancellations. By far the largest number about 60 per cent are of type 4 , minor changes in syntax and tone; a further 34 per cent are of type 3 , qualifications and minor semantic shifts.

Further, the lengthy addition at z-z is of philosophic interest, as are such additions as that at n-n , where Mill broadens the implications of his discussion to include contemporary philosophic issues. Method of Indicating Variants. All the substantive variants are governed by the principles enunciated below.

Changes involving the terminal punctuation of sentences are recorded, as are additions or deletions of parentheses and italics except in titles. The changes are of three kinds: addition of a word or words, substitution of a word or words, deletion of a word or words. Addition of a word or words: see a-a. Information concerning the use of this system of abbreviation is given in each headnote, as required.

Any added editorial information is enclosed in square brackets and italicized. Substitution of a word or words: see p-p. In this volume there are very few examples of passages that were altered more than once: an example is found at u-u. Here the different readings, in chronological order, are separated by a square bracket.

Deletion of a word or words: see i. Dates of footnotes: see n. Here the practice is to place immediately after the footnote indicator, in square brackets, the figure indicating the edition in which the footnote first appeared. If no such figure appears, the note is in all versions. Punctuation and spelling. In general, these are not normalized, and changes between versions are not recorded. Those changes which occur as part of a substantive variant are included in that variant, and the superscript letters in the text are placed exactly with reference to punctuation.

Changes between italic and roman type are treated as substantives, except in foreign phrases and titles of works which are normalized in italics. Other textual liberties. In an essay for the Monthly Repository composed at a time when Mill himself was still warmly inclined towards social organicism and historic continuity she had denounced root and branch the sinister 'conformity plan' imposed by the 'phantom power' of social opinion, through the arbitrary imposition of 'some standard of right or duty erected by some or other of the sets into which society is divided like a net—to catch gudgeons' Hayek , —9.

There were even some fundamental differences in their views on women. In the essays on divorce which they wrote for each other's benefit some time in —2, both argued that existing marriage laws were wholly unreasonable, and that to secure their economic independence women needed education on the same basis as men. But Mill suggested that liberalized divorce laws were mainly required by 'higher natures', and that for people in general there was some danger that 'giving facilities for retracting a bad choice' might actively encourage irresponsible entry into marriage.

He also thought that, even when relations between the sexes had been reformed, most wives and mothers would continue to be occupied in the home: 'it does not follow that a woman should actually support herself because she should be capable of doing so: in the natural course of events she will not', an opinion later echoed in The Subjection of Women Hayek , 65; Collected Works , Harriet by contrast argued for total civic equality between men and women, the opening of all occupations and public offices to both alike, and 'doing away with all laws whatever relating to marriage' Hayek , 77—8.

Shortly after this exchange of views, she wrote to Mill with some indignation suggesting that in intellectual concerns he was withholding from her his full confidence: 'in this, as in all these important matters there is no medium between the greatest, all , and none—anything less than all being insufficient. There might be just as well none' ibid. His fostering of conservative as well as radical opinion in the London and Westminster , and indeed his own writings for the review, indicate that his Coleridgean sympathies were still active in the late s.

Over the years, however, his correspondence with Harriet suggests that on a wide range of issues he was gradually brought round to her ways of thought.

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When she dissented from his views on such questions as Comtism, Fenianism, atheism, communism, Greek history, and the moral perfectibility of the human race, Mill almost invariably conceded that he was in the wrong and promised to think again: 'by thinking sufficiently I should probably come to think the same—as is almost always the case, I believe always when we think long enough' ibid.

These developments were paralleled by Mill's changing relationships with other figures to whom he had once been close. During the s and early s he severed relations with, or drifted away from, many members of the powerful intellectual circles of his youth— Roebuck and Grote , John and Sarah Austin , Sterling and Maurice , Thomas and Jane Carlyle. This happened for a variety of reasons— Roebuck was dismissed for advising Mill against his liaison with Harriet , while the Grotes and the Austins were suspected of malicious gossip.

Friendship with the Carlyles miraculously survived the famous incident of March when Mill arrived at Carlyle's house, speechless with distress, to confess that a maid had accidentally burned the manuscript of Carlyle's French Revolution. Carlyle at the time behaved with impeccable forbearance, and only later came to suspect—and to spread disgruntled rumours suggesting—that the real culprit had been Harriet.

By the late s Mill's friendship with Carlyle , though never entirely broken off, had markedly waned—more than twenty years before the great issues of political principle that were to divide them in later life. For Sterling Mill retained a lifelong affection, and in he was an original member of the notorious Sterling Club , founded by Sterling for discussion of heterodox opinions. But this most charismatic of his former associates was now chronically ill and often out of the country. Their friendship was renewed in when they spent several weeks together at Falmouth in the company of Henry , Mill's dying younger brother.

Mill afterwards wrote to Sterling that 'we have been more to each other lately than ever before', but confessed that 'even now I am very far from appearing to you as I am, for though there is nothing that I do not desire to show, there is much that I never do show, and much that I think you cannot even guess' Collected Works , Whether this was a reference to Harriet or to his intellectual differences with Sterling is impossible to say.

But in all these connections a complicating factor was Harriet's jealousy of rival spheres of influence and inability to tolerate people who disagreed with her: 'near relationships to persons of the most opposite principles to my own produces excessive embarrassment' Hayek , By the mids Mill had been won round to the view that on 'cardinal points of human opinion, agreement of conviction and feeling' was an 'essential requisite of anything worthy the name of friendship, in a really earnest mind' Collected Works , 1. Whatever the substantive content of Harriet's contribution may have been, her influence therefore served gradually to isolate Mill from direct intellectual interchange with many of his former associates.

From childhood Mill had been fascinated by the human mind and the foundations and processes of knowledge. Even in the depths of his mental crisis and subsequent attraction to Romantic thought, he seems never substantially to have departed from the views—transmitted via his father from the inheritance of Thomas Hobbes —that knowledge was rooted in material sensations, and that genuine scientific propositions were deductive in character, rather than as was claimed by Kantians, natural theologians, and the school of Reid and Dugald Stewart derived from a priori categories or from intuition and common sense.

These views were forged and sharpened not merely by his early reading in logic but by daily exposure to the economic reasoning of his father and Ricardo , and by the austere legal positivism in which he had been trained by Austin and Bentham. Nevertheless, there was more wavering in his opinions than Mill was later willing to admit; and the unravelling of his views is complicated by the varying ways in which both he and his antagonists used terms like a priori , deduction , and induction. Confusingly, both the sense-data school and the intuitionists claimed to be supporters of induction , but disagreed about its place in the sequence of scientific thought.

The former school usually, though not always held that general deductive laws could be built up from evidence initially supplied by induction, derived from 'observation of what passes in our own minds' and the 'general tendencies' of human nature. The latter school usually, though not always saw induction as the process that retrospectively tested a priori hypotheses generated within the mind itself.

Mill's thinking in this area over many years indicated some degree of uncertainty on a number of issues. In he was impressed by the argument of Richard Whately's Logic that knowledge derived from induction could never 'be built up into a regular demonstrative theory like that of the syllogism'. The major shock to his inherited views came, however, in from Macaulay's onslaught on James Mill's Essay on Government.

It was Macaulay's dismissal of his father's deductive approach to history—in combination with the historical theories of his Coleridgean and Saint-Simonian friends—that encouraged John Mill to think for a time of exploring these problems by writing a philosophical history of the French Revolution. In the early s he collected many materials for this work, but in the end was happy to pass them on to Carlyle , feeling that his own talents were essentially analytical—and in particular that thinking about thought, 'the science of science itself', was his peculiar forte. In the early s he was already working on the theory of syllogisms that was to be propounded twelve years later in book two of his System of Logic.

The Autobiography recorded that he 'could make nothing satisfactory of Induction, at this time'; but manuscript sources show him arguing, against Whately , that induction was 'as much entitled to be called Reasoning, as the demonstrations in Euclid ' Collected Works , 1. His 'Remarks on Bentham's philosophy' in , though more concerned with ethics than theories of knowledge, appeared to make a number of concessions to the intuitionist and anti-deductivist schools—particularly his criticism of Bentham's dismissal of character and conscience, and his rejection of Bentham's claim to have discovered a universal spring of human action that operated regardless of specific variations in history and culture, time and place.

In this essay Mill also questioned the view that there was any necessary connection between a thinker's philosophical views and his or her attitudes to practical politics Collected Works , But a year later his essay entitled 'On the definition of political economy' asserted the opposite view: 'systematic differences of opinion' in any sphere could always be traced back to 'a difference in their conceptions of the philosophic method' ibid.

Mill's views began to take shape more firmly, however, as certain leading members of the intuitionist school went on the polemical offensive—and as philosophers of all schools in the s and s became increasingly driven by the passionate quest for a holistic theory of knowledge. Mill was wrong in claiming in later years that intuitionism at this time had been all-powerful; but it was, none the less, strongly represented in certain powerful institutions, most notably the University of Cambridge, where it was closely linked with natural theology, the ethical teachings of Bishop Butler , and the promotion of induction as the practical investigative handmaid of certain categorical assumptions about the noumenal, natural, and social worlds.

In a lecture published by a leading proponent of this school, Adam Sedgwick , linked defence of induction to a broader attack on both the 'selfish' morals of the utilitarians, and their abstract, deductionist methodology. Sedgwick's lecture was mainly concerned with natural science, but it included the claim, in echo of Macaulay , that the facts of history were the only valid basis for a general understanding of politics and society—evoking from Mill the sharp retort that 'not only is history not the source of political philosophy, but the profoundest political philosophy is requisite to explain history … History is not the foundation, but the verification of the social science' Collected Works , His essay 'On the definition of political economy' also firmly restated the superior status of deductive reasoning: mere inductive verification a posteriori was 'no part of the business of science at all, but the application of science' ibid.

Mill continued to mull over these questions for more than a decade. In the late s his ideas were further crystallized, both positively and negatively, by the writings of Auguste Comte and William Whewell. From he was reading the first five volumes of Comte's Cours de philosophie positif , and his correspondence with Comte in —2 when his own study was far advanced shows him eagerly awaiting the sixth volume and declaring himself Comte's disciple.

The differences between them, he assured Comte , stemmed almost entirely from the fact that public opinion in England was too immature to tolerate a wholly non-religious, explicitly positivist philosophy. At the other extreme his ideas were powerfully influenced by two works from the second great Cambridge intuitionist, Whewell , The History of the Inductive Sciences and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences These two monumental works, designed to expose the logical fallacies of the tradition of Locke , aimed to hitch Baconian inductionism to the a priori reasoning of Immanuel Kant.

Like Kant , Whewell argued that there were certain necessary truths about the phenomenal universe—such as the existence of space, time, causality, and geometric forms—that could only be assumed and not proven. Such assumptions were essential to the formulation of general hypotheses, which could then be verified by inductive observation and experiment. Much of practical science, Whewell implied, consisted simply of inspired guesswork, followed up by meticulous case-by-case investigation.

All systematic knowledge consisted of an interaction between 'metaphysical ideas' and 'inductive movement'; without the former the latter was pointless, since 'in no case can experience prove a proposition to be necessarily or universally true' Whewell , 1. Whewell's examples were taken largely from mathematics and natural philosophy; but since the early s he had been a recurrent critic of the deductive method of Ricardo and James Mill , and his books were widely viewed, by Whewell himself as well as by others, as a further skirmish in the war against sensationalist theories of mind and abstract political economy.

Whewell's studies provided Mill with a mass of practical examples of scientific method, sifted for him by Alexander Bain , who was later to be his first biographer and chief philosophic disciple. Whewell's Philosophy in particular acted as a timely catalyst that helped him to weld together his own still somewhat disparate thoughts on scientific reasoning. The result was A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive , published after twelve years' gestation in Mill began his book with the assertion that he was not concerned with the contested territory of epistemology, but only with the structure of logical argument.

This austere agenda proved, however, impossible to observe at every point, and the text frequently spilt over into deep questions of human understanding. Throughout his work Mill concurred with Whewell that knowledge was a unity, but he claimed much more explicitly than Whewell that social knowledge was comparable in kind, if not necessarily in degree, with knowledge in the natural sciences. He agreed also about the importance of induction, but disagreed fundamentally about the relation of inductive knowledge to general propositions in either natural or social science.

For Whewell , the very possibility of scientific enquiry was rooted in certain inherently untestable a priori assumptions, armed with which it was possible to make sense of empirical data and only thus to formulate general laws. For Mill general propositions other than those that were purely syllogistic were deductions, themselves initially derived by inference from induction, without reference at any stage to categorical ideas.

Substances were the sirens that lured unwary logicians to their doom, down false trails such as animism, mysticism, the Platonic theory of forms, linguistic and mathematical essentialism, the Christian doctrine of human nature, and—closer to Mill's own day—the common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart and the idealism of Kant. The stage to which a particular science had developed and the general conditions under which it operated determined whether inference from deduction or induction took priority. Such inference he claimed was the basis of all scientific, as opposed to merely imaginative, thought about everything from mathematics and celestial mechanics through to mankind living in society and the individual human mind.

Even concepts relating to objects imperceptible in nature, such as perfect circles and lines without breadth, could ultimately be traced back, not to axiomatic truths, but to a mental process of neutralizing non-relevant sense-data just as non-wealth-producing motives and passions were excluded by economists from study of the pursuit of wealth.

Mill's account of geometry challenged the wellnigh universal view that mathematical theorems were intrinsically axiomatic rather than inductive. But the most controversial parts of his thesis, as Mill himself intended, were those that related to the deductive character of social and moral science; and much of book six of the Logic was devoted to anticipating possible objections in this area.

These objections related primarily to four interrelated problems: free will, the nature of mind, sociological method, and the precise character of deductive reasoning in relation to such volatile and variable subject matter as the working of human society. In defending the compatibility of social laws with free will, Mill was deeply concerned to dissociate himself from the currently vociferous Owenite view that human character was the creature of social forces and that individuals therefore had no choice and no responsibility for their own deeds.

Instead he claimed that law-like regularities in human behaviour in no way precluded the possibility of free will. The study of mind was imperfectly developed, but was, he claimed, no different in principle from the study of other complex phenomena. As with astronomy, however, the scope for induction and experiment in the study of mind was limited; it could only advance by grafting elementary inductive psychology onto the still embryonic deductive study of 'Ethology' or the science of character, which was concerned with formulating 'general laws of human nature' ibid.

Laws relating to individual behaviour would also be the basis of the study of 'human beings united together in the social state', since 'human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of individual man' ibid. The appropriate method for social enquiry was the 'Concrete Deductive Method … of which astronomy furnishes the most perfect, natural philosophy a somewhat less perfect, example' Collected Works , 8. Here Mill admitted a provisional role for 'a system of deductions a priori ', though he insisted that 'the ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the a priori reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those of observation a posteriori ' ibid.

Sociology's reliance on such retrospective induction meant that it could not be a 'science of positive predictions' but only of general 'tendencies', the latter constantly liable to disruption by the fact that so many countless threads of social causation were constantly mingled together. The main goal of the social sciences should therefore be, not to assert universal causal laws, but the much more limited methodological goal, of 'teach[ing] us how to frame the proper theorem for the circumstances of any given case' ibid.

A further complication was that human societies did not merely differ within themselves, and from each other, but also changed over time, thus producing a degree of complexity that 'could not possibly be computed by human faculties from the elementary laws which produce it' Collected Works , 8.

The proper procedure here, Mill suggested, was to supplement concrete deduction by the inverse deductive method proposed by Comte. To illustrate the kind of laws comprised under the former, Mill quoted the long passage in his own 'Essay on Coleridge' , where he had identified the three preconditions of social union in all known historical societies, among them a sense of transcendent origin or purpose Mill on Bentham and Coleridge , — On social dynamics he was somewhat more equivocal: societies everywhere seemed to be demonstrating 'certain general tendencies', such as the shift from military to industrial organization, the predominance of masses over individuals, and the ascendancy of minds over bodies; but these tendencies had not yet advanced beyond the status of limited empirical laws.

What was needed, Mill conjectured, was an 'element in the complex existence of social man' that could both interpret the sequence of social causation and itself be a prime agent of future social change. And, by a happy 'consilience', it so happened that just such an element did in fact exist Collected Works , 8. The combined evidence of history and human nature proved that 'the speculative faculties of mankind' were not merely the necessary medium of social understanding, but, increasingly, were themselves 'predominant … almost paramount, among the agents of social progression' ibid.

On its initial publication in A System of Logic attracted little public comment, a silence that betokened, according to one contemporary, R. Hutton , not lack of interest but sheer terror among the book-reviewing community at the thought of incurring the crossfire of Mill's dialectical powers. Within a very few years, however, it was to become one of the most influential and controversial works of the mid-nineteenth century. Despite Mill's earlier intention of reconciling rival positions, his correspondence with Comte suggests that by the early s he had come to see his book not just as a disinterested work on scientific method but as a polemical attack on the very possibility of metaphysics and theology, at least as conceived by most practitioners of those disciplines in the early Victorian era.

Over the next three decades, however, its arguments were to be assimilated in the most unlikely quarters. The book appeared in eight different editions over the course of Mill's lifetime, that of being, under Harriet's tutelage, the most heavily revised. The edition of included an additional chapter on Buckle's History of Civilization in England and , which expounded more fully Mill's thesis that history was the product of dialectical interplay between psycho-social conditions and men's 'own peculiar characters'. After the mids Mill gradually withdrew from his correspondence with Comte , increasingly perturbed by his former mentor's anti-feminism, constant requests for financial help, and something Mill appears not to have noticed before lack of interest in proof and induction.

But, despite excision of the first edition's flattering references to Comte , later editions were if anything even more positivist in sentiment than that of —incorporating long passages from Comte's predictions of global convergence towards a heavily industrialized, politically collectivized, and culturally homogenized society of the future. Mill himself clearly hoped that the development of a more precise social science would be a central theme of his own future work in systematic theory, and for some time after publication of the Logic , he was exploring ideas for a projected work on ethology and the study of national character.

But the project made little progress, and in the mids he returned to his earlier studies of the one area of social science in which deductive theory had already made significant headway—the study of political economy. Mill had drafted a series of theoretical essays on economic problems in the early s, only one of which had been published at the time. In they appeared as a single volume, Some Unsettled Questions on Political Economy , which was to become the nucleus of a much larger enterprise.

Mill's writings on economic theory demonstrated, perhaps even more clearly than book six of the Logic , some of his core preoccupations both as a social philosopher and as a theorist of scientific method. His early essays largely accepted the theoretical model that he had learned as a child from his father and Ricardo. Within this model it was assumed, for purposes of scientific analysis, that rational pursuit of wealth could be isolated as the mainspring of human behaviour, that the economy was an integrated self-correcting system, and that distribution of rewards was inexorably determined by the relative availability of the three prime factors of production land, labour, and capital.

Even in his early writings, however, there were fleeting signs of discontent with the deterministic and ahistorical character of Ricardo's and James Mill's ideas. His espousal of Place's campaign for birth-control, for example, was propelled not simply by the practical view that large families necessarily brought poverty to working-class households, but by the more theoretical belief that labour in general could enhance its share of wealth by deliberately increasing its own scarcity. His essay on Harriet Martineau appeared to endorse his father's geometric method, by claiming that, just as 'he who has solved a certain number of algebraic equations, can without difficulty solve others, so he who knows the economy of England, or even Yorkshire, knows that of all nations actual or possible'.

But he qualified this claim by suggesting that it applied only to 'method of investigation', that local circumstances were variable, and that the economist should 'have sense enough not to expect the same conclusion to issue from varying premises' Collected Works , 4. His essays on Ireland, for example, argued that abstract poor law principles suited to the way labourers behaved in industrialized England were totally unsuited to the way labourers behaved in agricultural Ireland, where they would inevitably promote fraud, dependence, and explosion of population—though a sceptic might note that Mill never visited Ireland or the industrialized regions of England, and that his personal experience of the way labourers behaved in both countries was virtually nil.

Recurrent debate about the condition of labour was nevertheless the crucible that in the mids persuaded Mill to attempt to write a major synoptic work that would expand and bring up to date the classic treatises of Smith and Ricardo. Resolving to rescue political economy from this discredit, he set to work to compose his great treatise, Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy , published early in Mill's Principles substantially restated the theorems about optimum conditions for production, circulation of money, and utilization of land, labour, and capital that he had learned from his father and Ricardo.

Like them he portrayed the laws of political economy, not as the ideological underpinning of current economic arrangements, but as a critical, progressive science which—if fully incorporated into policy—would dissolve the bastions of feudalism and monopoly that still dominated many areas of economic life. Like his predecessors he assumed a global framework for assessing comparative advantage; and like them he envisaged that removal of all impediments to true economic laws must ultimately lead, like the removal of friction in mechanics, to the onset of a 'stationary state'.

But as its title implied, the Principles set these laws in a much more overtly social context than had been employed by Mill's predecessors. It suggested, for example, that there was nothing to fear in the eventual stationary state, because it could come about only after the prior abolition of monopolies, which would have put an end to structural—as opposed to meritorious—inequalities of income and wealth it was something quite different from the 'Chinese stationariness' that Mill was later to deplore in his political writings.

Mill argued also that certain features of economic law—such as the tendency of wages never to rise permanently above subsistence—could be circumvented by improvements in social organization and the growth of human capital. Such developments were most clearly predicted in the chapter 'On the probable futurity of the labouring classes' , which Mill attributed to the inspiration of Harriet Taylor ; and, although no archival evidence proves her authorship, the vocabulary used in the chapter and even more so in later editions seems to suggest that her involvement was far from passive.

This chapter reiterated Mill's dismissal of the claim of philanthropists that economic improvement depended on fulfilment of personal obligations from rich to poor. In an echo of his Coleridgean phase, he admitted the attractions of 'a form of society abounding in strong personal attachments and disinterested self-devotion', but concluded that the age of paternal government—'the whole fabric of patriarchal or seigneurial influence'—was now irrevocably past.

Newspapers, Chartism, and the downward percolation of the 'principles of the Reformation', all meant that 'the poor have come out of leading-strings, and cannot any longer be treated like children' Collected Works , 4. The way ahead lay not in philanthropy and personal obligation, but in education, association, and co-operation—the latter to be not the paternalist egalitarian co-operativism of Robert Owen , but self-governing co-operatives of independent members, each entitled to a return proportionate to what they had put in.

Under such a system the interests of employers and workers would gradually shade into one another, thus doing away not just with residual patriarchy, but with the structural segregation of classes implicitly entailed in the theory of Ricardo Collected Works , 4. From the moment of publication, Mill's Principles was hailed as a classic, far more congenial to the public than earlier economic textbooks, and far more readable than the Logic. Mill later claimed that, if he and Harriet had anticipated the changes in public opinion that occurred in that year, they would have composed the Principles in much more ambitious and 'socialist' terms; and certainly the third edition of was much more explicit about the extent of their shift towards such themes as co-operative partnership, common ownership of landed property, and the evils of 'division of the human race into two hereditary classes, employers and employed' Collected Works , 4.

The third edition also developed much more fully a theme only hinted at three years earlier, of the parallels between the servitude of workers under capitalist production and the 'patriarchal despotism' imposed on those, mostly women, who were confined to the home. Yet despite Mill's increasing identification of himself as a socialist, there was little change in his views on the role of the state, which he saw as largely confined to the traditional liberal agenda of maintaining a sound currency and to the more radical liberal agenda of dismantling or taxing monopolies.

Later editions elaborated his ideas on the export of capital necessary in advanced countries to counteract diminishing returns and his theory of taxation opposed to progressive income tax as liable to reduce incentives, but in favour of heavy duties on land, development values, and inherited wealth. An edition of greatly extended the discussion of recent working-class experiments in co-operation, friendly societies, and self-help; and the final revision of included a tentative reference to his abandonment of Ricardo's doctrine of the wages fund, which had denied the possibility of an artificial increase in real wages without automatic reduction in the volume of employment.

In his introduction to the edition Mill remarked that the time was not yet ripe for the full incorporation of such lines of thought in a general treatise on political economy. But his revisions were widely read as giving countenance to militant trade unionism, and he was obliged to resign from the ultra-orthodox Political Economy Club which he had joined forty years before.

Despite its immense popularity, Mill's Principles still left largely unsolved many of the issues raised by his own Logic , chief among them the relation of individuals to society, and the question of how a social science, comparable in certainty with celestial mechanics, could also take account of historical contingency and particularity. The revised editions of the Principles suggest that over time Mill became less interested in economics as an abstract science, and more interested in its prescriptive use as a tool of civic morality and social policy.

This shift away from scientific method towards morals and politics may well have been influenced by his wife, since there can be no doubt that her interests lay more in the latter areas. Because of Mill's ill health, and his promotion in to the chief examinership at the East India Company , he published little during the s other than journalistic pieces. The last two years of his official life, falling in the aftermath of the Indian mutiny, were spent defending the administrative record of the company which he portrayed as a regime of enlightened paternal government for the benefit of India against proposals for a transfer to direct rule from Britain which he portrayed as inevitably leading to rule in the interests of the governing power.

Nevertheless, the eight years of his marriage were a fertile seedbed for Mill's later thought; and, despite prolonged sick leave and official pressures, he was continuously engaged in drafting the works that were eventually to appear as On Liberty , Representative Government , Utilitarianism , The Subjection of Women , and the Autobiography. His first publication after Harriet's death was the pamphlet Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform , which favoured a system of plural voting based on level of education his own particular concern and opposed the secret ballot—the latter a view 'in which she had rather preceded me' Collected Works , 1.

But the chief monument to her memory Mill saw as his essay On Liberty , 'so much of which was the work of her whom I had lost … I have made no alteration or addition to it, nor shall I ever'. A draft paper on liberty had been sketched out in , in response to The Sphere and Duties of Government , a translation of the work by Alexander von Humboldt originally published in the s; but it was while travelling in Italy and Greece early in that Mill conceived the idea of a more ambitious work.

The final version appeared in , within a few months of Harriet's death. Though lacking 'the inestimable advantage of her revision' Collected Works , The text began with an attempt to dissociate the work from the deadlock of free will versus structural determinism that had dogged Mill's earlier social writings. Its subject matter was not the 'so-called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philosophical Necessity'; rather it was 'Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual' ibid.

In this latter sphere, the lines of historical development that Mill as a social scientist had portrayed as universal, progressive, and largely beneficent, now reappeared as menacing, morally coercive, and tending to 'render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind' ibid. Threats to personal liberty from tyrants, Mill argued, were no longer a problem in advanced societies, but were being replaced by pressure of public opinion—'a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression', because more insidious and tending to enslavement of 'the soul itself'.

Throughout Europe, business, philanthropy, education, fashion, and communications were all combining to subvert the 'plurality of paths' that had been the glory of European civilization, and to replace it with the 'Chinese ideal of making all people alike' ibid. Such trends were reinforced by the quietism of traditional Christianity, the 'bigotry' of contemporary Christian revivalism, and the emergence of newer religions more repressive than the systems they sought to replace—a trend exemplified by the later doctrines of Comte ibid.

Everywhere, Mill claimed, original thought was being stunted and truths glossed over by the race towards uniformity, while in planning their private lives, men were submitting like machines to unreflecting custom, exercising no other faculty 'than the ape-like one of imitation' ibid. The result was that 'mind itself is bowed to the yoke; even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of' ibid. And even in England:.